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Abstract  
 
Recent research has shown that a collection of neurons in dorsal anterior cingulate 
cortex of Rhesus monkeys may specifically encode the choice selection of an interaction 
partner. This raises interesting and important questions as to the nature of theory of 
mind processes in social interactive decision-making, with potential societal implications. 
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One notable aspect of human decision-making is the ubiquity of our cooperative 
interactions [1], both with specific others or with societal institutions more broadly. We 
generally return the favors of others - we help a friend move in the expectation of 
future help in return. We also cooperate on a larger scale, for example we pay our taxes 
when we could potentially avoid doing so. Many of these social choices are risky, that is, 
we are often unsure if our positive acts will indeed be reciprocated in the future, and a 
key component of our decisions to cooperate is to what degree we can predict that our 
partner in the exchange will be willing to commit to cooperation. Therefore one 
extremely important aspect of understanding the motivations and mechanisms 
underlying these important choices is how we represent the likely decisions of others. 
 
In a recent compelling paper, Haroush & Williams [2] outline the case for a grouping of 
neurons in the primate brain that appear to specifically encode the choice selection of 
an interaction partner. These neurons, in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex of Rhesus 
monkeys, were observed using single-unit recording while the monkeys played a variant 
of the oft-studied iterative Prisoner’s Dilemma game, where players must decide to 
either cooperate with a partner for a potential joint positive gain, or defect to guarantee 
themselves a payoff at the expense of their partner. Using these signals, the monkey's 
own choice could be correctly predicted on over 65% of rounds. However, using the 
same signals they were also able to predict the other, physically present, monkey's 
unobserved choices with even higher accuracy, namely 79%. In other words, these dACC 
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neurons encoded information enabling the monkey to, at least in principle, predict the 
other's future behavior with high accuracy. 
 
The concept of Theory of Mind (ToM) refers to the ability to understand and predict the 
behavior of others, and by isolating cells that appear to represent the as yet unknown 
intentions of a game partner, these data support the idea that ToM is a fundamental 
and specific process, and raise intriguing questions on three distinct levels. On the 
computational level: under which circumstances these neurons get engaged, and how 
this impacts strategic decisions. On the neural level: how do these “other”-encoding 
dACC neurons fit into a larger ToM network that implements these computations. 
Finally, on a socio-behavioral level: to what extent the physical presence of others 
modulates the perception of social context. 
 
Firstly, these results shed light on the circumstances under which ToM is engaged. In a 
control experiment, when the first monkey defected and this choice was explicitly 
shown to the second monkey, the latter defected in turn on over 90% of the rounds; 
that is, the second monkey successfully avoided exploitation. Notably however, when 
the monkeys made their choice without directly observing the decision of the other, 
they cooperated substantially more often. Given that the neural predictions were very 
accurate, and so presumably should not lead to different decisions than observation, 
what underlies this difference in cooperation rates? Does revealing one's intentions 
explicitly change how the ToM network of others is engaged, thus altering the tendency 
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to cooperate by impacting the certainty of beliefs about the other’s behavior? It may 
require a revision of current models of strategic behavior to account for these different 
levels of cooperation. Recent computational models based on human experiments with 
similar two-player games suggest that people adapt their decisions based on how they 
expect others will behave [3,4] as well as how they believe others expect them to 
behave [5]. One possible extension based on these results could therefore be to 
explicitly model how certain we are about such beliefs and how this (un)certainty affects 
our choices.   
In terms of the broader neural basis of ToM, in humans this network encompasses 
posterior areas such as temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) and superior temporal sulcus 
(STS), as well as anterior areas such as medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) and dACC, with 
each connection appearing to subserve a specific function [6]. The present paper offers 
useful and novel insights as to the neuronal specificity of the dACC: disrupting this area 
via electrical stimulation seemed to specifically affect how the last interaction was taken 
into account. Without disruption, monkeys cooperated more on rounds following 
mutual cooperation; with disruption, monkeys cooperated substantially less often after 
rounds where the partner had cooperated, appearing not to take that information into 
account. These findings suggest a specific contribution of the dACC within the ToM 
network: processing information about past events. Future studies could assess whether 
this area is engaged in the retrieval of the other’s behavior, the assessment of the 
other’s actions, or perhaps the integration of all of this information. Further, it would be 
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useful, if technically feasible, to consider simultaneously recording from other regions of 
this network in order to shed light on the neuronal functionality of the network as a 
whole. 
 
Finally, the findings also relate to the physical presence of another individual, suggesting 
the existence of a specific social context sensitivity, even at the neural level: Playing with 
monkeys who were in another room yielded a reduced cooperation rate, to one 
indistinguishable from when playing with a computer partner. Importantly, the number 
of neurons encoding the other's unobserved choices also decreased in this context, 
suggesting a role for physical presence in social preference. Results from a variety of 
studies demonstrate that humans perceive agency and intentions even in the absence 
of the physical presence of the other. For example, just knowing that the partner in a 
Prisoner’s Dilemma is human increases cooperation, as well as the ToM’s network 
associated activation [7]. However, it has been shown that an increase in physical 
distance does lead to a decrease in cooperation [8,9], and thus it could indeed be the 
case that as one’s game partner becomes physically more distant a reduction in the 
neural encoding of social context, and, consequently, a reduction in prosocial behavior 
is observed. Understanding the extent of this neuronal specificity for others’ physical 
presence in areas associated with complex decision-making, such as dACC and MPFC, 
would be a useful direction for future research. Given the increasing lack of face-to-face 
interaction in modern society, it may be fruitful to consider ways of boosting direct 
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contact in situations where social bonds are desirable, such as social media or internet 
banking, demonstrating the use of these approaches in assisting with policy designs. 
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